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points of distinction between his views and theirs, Clemen declares: "There is not a single dogmatical idea by which Ritschl is distinguished from his nearest predecessors and contemporaries which was not present in Schleiermacher's system at least in germ; yes, even the most important supplement which Herrmann has made to Ritschl's system is found beforehand in Schleiermacher."

Clemen proceeds to point out the lack of harmony between Schleiermacher's definition of religion and his conception of Christianity as redemptive, the failure to do justice to historical truth in his interpretation of Christianity, and the impossibility of developing a peculiarly Christian dogmatic out of the antithesis of sin and grace within the consciousness. Yet our author finds so many germinal ideas in Schleiermacher manifesting themselves in the speculative systems of succeeding dogmaticians, that he quotes with approval the prophetic saying of Gass in 1822: "With Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* a new epoch in the whole range of theological studies will begin;" and the statement of Bernoulli in 1897: "The history of Protestant dogmatics in the nineteenth century is the history of Schleiermacher's influence."

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SOME RECENT BOOKS ON CATHOLIC THEOLOGY

The Roman Catholic religion may be considered as a spiritual force moving men upward and onward to Christ; it may be considered as a theology, representing the adjustment of divine revelation to the growing intellectual needs of mankind; it may be considered as a polity governing the world in things spiritual, and organizing the spiritual forces at its command for the greater glory of Christ.

As a theology the Catholic religion presents today its most interesting, its most instructive side.

Since Leo XIII ascended the papal throne, the zeal for things intellectual has grown apace in Catholic circles. The great encyclical "Aeterni Patris" (1879) sought to bring again into vogue the philosophy of the Schoolmen, and particularly the doctrines of Thomas Aquinas, to the end that Catholic scholars might be able to "give reason for the hope that was in them." The intellectualism which is so marked in Thomas was dominant for a time; then there came a decided tendency to return to the positions advocated by Scotus and his followers. Leo revived interest in sociological science by his letters on "Democracy," "Labor," and kindred

topics; and this interest, at first intellectual, has produced practical results in Italy, Germany, Belgium, and France. Leo opened up the Vatican archives to all serious students, and there has resulted a new epoch in writing church history in accord with the best scientific methods of the day.

When over ninety years of age, Leo established the "Biblical Commission," that Catholic scholarship might keep abreast of the times, and satisfy the demands of Catholic students who look to the church for direction in all that concerns Holy Scripture. The result of this ferment is a new theological literature, which endeavors to state the position of the ancient faith in the way of modern thought, and gives to Catholic Christianity the apologetic needed in the world of today.

The works we have chosen show that constructive and destructive forces are at work.

The method pursued is largely positive, largely historical. The writers strive to show how any phase of Christian thought has developed from its original elements into the fuller expansion of a theology; they point out that such growth is no deviation, but rather the natural outcome of the original revelation; they are chary of the use of words that would make the original deposit a mere fossil, and Christianity the resultant of the addition of "foreign elements," a sort of geological stratification; they contend ever that Catholic doctrine is rather an *organic* whole, and its growth and development the result of the principle of living continuity. And this *traditio semper viva*, they hold, is guided by the Spirit of truth promised to the church, and abiding with it forever. This view of doctrinal development certainly puts Catholic scholars in a position to defend Christianity in the face of a century that explains all things by a theory of organic evolution. In some instances we see the influence of a destructive spirit, and there are a few cases in which men have allowed a critical and negative spirit to undermine their faith. This latter phase is represented by such men as Marcel Hébert. In his work *L'évolution de la foi catholique*,¹ he follows what he calls the *méthode positive*. He endeavors to trace the growth of Catholic faith from the religious sentiment born in man, to its transformation into a theology. He states that the Old Testament hardly possesses a theology in the full sense of that word, but only a theology *en images, en mythes* (p. 15). He finds a more developed theology in Paul and in the gospels, particularly in John's gospel, where the tendency to express the sentiments of early Christianity by images and ideas has become more and more intense. But in the main body of his work he

¹ *L'évolution de la foi catholique*. Par Marcel Hébert. Paris: Alcan, 1905. 257 pages. Fr. 5.

professes to describe chiefly the attitude of the Catholic church on the question of the relationship between faith and reason. He traces the doctrine from the earlier Fathers through the Schoolmen, even to the time since the Vatican Council. He concludes that, though the Catholic faith has been an interesting phase in the evolution of the human conscience, still its day has passed; and he predicts that the present apologetic, put forward by Brunetière, Loisy, and others, is destined to serve merely as a transition to a purer religion—a sort of socialism which will interest, not as an economical theory, but as an evolution of a new mental point of view—*évolution d'une nouvelle "mentalité"* (pp. 209, 210).

Throughout the works of the constructive party one is struck by the scholar-like modesty with which conclusions are put forward but at the same time by that sense of security that is ever present when the human mind feels a greater power back of its attempts at truth.

The attitude of the new apologetic toward some questions is particularly enlightening. We choose for illustration: (1) the much-mooted question of the power of the human mind to reach a knowledge of God and things divine; (2) the problem of the development of doctrine; (3) the problem of the actual development of theology in the New Testament; (4) the attitude of the new apologetic to modern Scripture controversies, especially to the question of "inspiration."

Marcel Hébert seems to think that the Catholic church is bound by the Vatican Council to an impossible intellectualism, which must eventually be its undoing. He recalls the decree in which the council, asserting a rational basis for our belief in God, states that human reason can with certainty reach a knowledge of God's existence (p. 163). He sees in the new apologetic of Brunetière, Blondel, and Loisy a return to the doctrine of the Traditionalists or Fideists. He describes Catholic dogma as in the grasp of a vise, philosophic thought on one side and historical criticism on the other; and, with a dogmatism proper to such men, he prophesies the final destruction of the Catholic religion—"qu'il y soit brisé, c'est incontestable" (p. 164).

Among Catholic schools in times past there was one which, denying reason its sovereign rights, met with condemnation. It was at this school, represented by such men as Bautain and Lamennais, that the council aimed its decision. True, Pascal, Bossuet, and Newman, following the path of earlier writers, have been accused of refusing to accept the finality of the ordinary metaphysical demonstrations for the existence of God; but it is not possible to show that they run foul of the Council of the Vatican, and equally impossible is it to reach such a conclusion in the case of

Brunetière or Loisy. True, the council has defined in the second chapter of *De Revelatione* that "the church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, may be *known* with certainty by the natural light of human reason, by means of created things;" and one recognizes that such a position is not only good philosophy, but is also the evident doctrine of Paul in the first chapter of his epistle to the Romans: "For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, his eternal power also and divinity." Nor does M. Hébert refuse to recognize at least the theoretic value of this teaching:

Let us recognize, first of all, that from the theoretical point of view this teaching of the church is unassailable. If reason proves that God exists and can speak to us, and if the facts show that he has really spoken to us, the duty of believing is indisputable (p. 164).

But he immediately adds:

But are the philosophic proofs of the existence of God so established, and are we sure of the authenticity of the gospel documents containing the miracles which attest this revelation? We know that it is not so. The latest works of Abbé Loisy have given us the results of a conscientious and loyal criticism. Jesus was conceived of a virgin and was raised from the dead, not historically or physically, but "for faith." As to the idea of God, Loisy who, fearing lest he should be accused of being influenced in his criticism, as was Renan, by philosophical theories (e. g., *a priori* denial of the supernatural), has always avowed a dislike for metaphysics, nevertheless cannot refrain from declaring: "The advance of science presents the problem of God in new aspects" (p. 164).

He attempts to read into the council what is not there. The council purposely omitted the word *demonstrari* from its decree, and inserted *cognosci*; and with Catholics the term "reason" includes conscience and moral sentiment as well as understanding, nor are they bound to believe that the philosophical demonstrations, so called, necessarily hold every intellect. They believe, after the fashion of Paul, that in some way from the works of God man may have a certain conviction of God's existence. Pascal's position is therefore not condemned; for, though there is much doubt concerning some passages found in his writings, still Pascal was a firm believer in the power of man to reach God through nature, though in nature he included man's power to know and man's power to feel.² Nor is

² *La vraie religion selon Pascal*. Par Sully Prudhomme. Paris: Alcan, 1905. 439 pages. Fr. 7.50. In this work the author with rare judgment arranges methodically the sayings of Pascal on matters religious, and defends him from the charge of skepticism brought against him.

Newman read out of the church, though he, too, may have doubted the convincing power of the ordinary arguments, and appealed to the argument from conscience; though he may have asserted that the ordinary demonstrations, good in themselves, do not appeal to the intellect of our day. This doctrine is not new in the church. True, our apologetic has been made largely on the lines laid down by the Thomists, but from the days of scholastic supremacy the followers of Scotus curtailed the province of reason, and maintained a sort of supremacy of moral feeling over the intellect in the acquisition of religious truth.³ And it is with the apologetic of Duns Scotus and Cardinal Newman that the Catholic writer today meets the agnostic position set down by the author of the *Évolution de la foi catholique*, and brings the good old doctrine of "immanence" to the help of intellectualism in his campaign against unbelief.

M. Hébert in the above-cited passage finds fault, too, because Catholic apologists declare that faith in Jesus Christ, faith in his resurrection, results not from philosophy or history alone (p. 164). The council does decree:

In order that our faith might be in harmony with reason, God willed that to the interior help of the Holy Spirit there should be joined exterior proofs of his revelation. Thus, while the assent of faith is by no means a blind action of the mind, still no man can assent to the gospel (much less to individual truths) without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost.

History, philosophy, and the spirit of faith, the moral temper expressed in the question, "What must I do to be saved?" all combine to produce our acceptance of Christ.

That in Catholic theology there has been *growth and development* needs no proof. To formulate a theory of development is not so easy, and in the Catholic church it seems to have special difficulties. All are agreed that revelation submitted to the ordinary processes of the human mind must expand; and this particularly because revelation was given "at sundry times and in divers manners," and was not proclaimed after the logical order of a religious system; and also because much has been revealed, not explicitly, not clearly, but in an implied fashion and dimly. All, too, are agreed that the church in her formulæ must use a human language, while speaking of truths that are beyond man's ken. These formulæ are ever inadequate, and will sometimes appear inaccurate, if pressed too closely. Will not the human mind pondering over these truths gradually reach clearer understanding of divine revelation, especially as the great purposes of God unfold through the ages; and will not this

³ *New York Review*, Vol. I, No. 1, "Scotus Redivivus."

clearer understanding produce a clearer human expression of revealed truth? Some law, therefore, of development must be admitted.

In present Catholic theology there is a certain wise timidity in accepting a fixed theory of doctrinal evolution. The hesitation displeases many non-catholic writers, and our attempts to formulate theories are also severely criticised (Hébert, p. 168). In the presence of a question so delicate, one may commend modesty and reserve, and, before all the facts are obtained, one may praise those who hesitate to form a synthesis. Tixeront,⁴ in a note at p. 7, writes concerning this subject as follows:

As I am not writing a treatise on theology, I will not here set forth the theory of the development of dogma and the manner in which either Catholics or Protestants understand it. A few remarks will serve our purpose. The history of dogma assumes that these dogmas have passed through certain changes and that they have been subjected to certain developments or transformations. For only living and changing things have a history. The existence of these changes cannot even be questioned. We need only to open our eyes to see them. The important point is to determine upon the character and results of these vicissitudes, to notice their limits, their causes, and laws; in a word, to state in what measure the substance of dogma is affected by this evolution. The subject can be treated theoretically from the *a priori* standpoint, building upon the teaching of the church the inherent immutability of dogma; or it can be treated *a posteriori*, by the historical method, collecting the results that a close study of the facts reveals. This latter method is naturally the only one which the historian can follow. Protestant authors and rationalists assert that historical study has led them to the conclusion that the primitive deposit of Christian revelation has not only been scientifically expounded and developed in subsequent dogma, but has been very substantially altered and modified. As an example of this view see Harnack's statement.⁵ Quite different, as is well known, are the conclusions reached by Newman, while he was still an Anglican, on the basis of like historical investigations, and set forth by him in his well-known essay, mentioned above. Catholics have, as a body, accepted these views. But, I will add, the theory of the development of dogma, although much studied in our day, is far from being satisfactorily worked out. Scholars are generally too much given to vague formulæ, simple inexact analogies (the child who becomes a man, the seedling that becomes a tree). The question to which we must give a technical and satisfying reply is this: Under what circumstances is an idea or a doctrine, related to another idea or another doctrine, only a simple development, and under what circumstances is it an alteration or a real transformation? For example, can the idea of the church be considered as a simple development of the eschatological

⁴ *Histoire des dogmes: I, La théologie anténicéenne*. Par J. Tixeront. Paris: Lecoffre, 1905. 475 pages. Fr. 3.50.

⁵ *Précis de l'histoire de dogmas*, Introduction, p. x.

idea of the kingdom of God, or is it rather something quite different? The analogy of the oak which grows from the acorn shows how doctrines can differ in appearance while in reality proceeding one from the other. To this problem not enough attention has been given by certain writers who manifest too narrow a conception of the progress of dogma.

There is a feeling that the old concept of doctrinal development was too narrow, too restricted; that a larger development must be admitted to meet the facts which history ever brings before us. How this theory will be formulated remains to be seen. The subject is receiving much attention, and permanent results may be expected ere long.

Perhaps the condition of Catholic thought concerning *doctrinal development* may be best illustrated by the teachings of Catholic writers anent a gradual development even in the New Testament. Father Tixeront is very interesting from this standpoint. He lays down the principle that the Holy Spirit guided the apostles in their teaching, and that the office of the apostles was to complete and to bring into a harmonious whole the doctrine of the Master. He distinguishes five different stages in the development of Christ's teaching in the New Testament: (1) the words that came from Christ's own lips; (2) the apostolic teaching prior to Paul; (3) Paul's teaching; (4) the teaching of the apostles after Paul; (5) the teaching of the gospel of John (p. 63). In the synoptists Christ's words hardly go beyond the bounds of Jewish thought. True, the horizon is ever enlarged, the spirit is loftier, the concepts are more spiritual, but not so as to make his words unintelligible to a Jewish audience (p. 113). Paul accommodates his thought to the Greeks and the Hellenizing Hebrews, while John, setting aside the particularism of the Jew, proclaims the universality of the religion of Christ, and the Messiah of the Jews is proclaimed in clearest terms the "Word made flesh," true God of true God, who gives light and life to men. He writes:

It is in the gospels that we have access to the personal teaching of Jesus Christ. The synoptics give us the accepted form in a redaction which unquestionably reproduces most closely the original teaching. The fourth gospel has perhaps preserved certain more profound expositions of the Master's teachings, but, on any hypothesis, has given us transformation rather than a literal reproduction of them (p. 63).

And the great question that underlies such doctrine he puts tentatively as follows (p. 63, n. I):

These two sources, however, can and must be used, if we wish to arrive at an exact and complete interpretation of them. Two questions present themselves here which I cannot discuss, but on which, practically, I must take sides. First, can the discourses represented by the fourth gospel to be the discourses of

Jesus Christ, be considered as representing accurately his preaching, and, consequently, can they be used in expounding the teachings of the Master?⁶

Second, although recognizing in general the faithful reproduction of Christ's teachings in the synoptics, may we not recognize here some departure distinguishing what was really spoken by the Savior in person from a later development of Christian thought attributed to him before the final redaction of the gospels? But suppose that it were possible and legitimate (this we cannot absolutely deny), we could not undertake it here, and, on the whole, for our purpose, it would not lead to any important result, since it is generally admitted that the doctrine transmitted by the synoptics is, save perhaps in a few particulars, the original doctrine of Jesus.⁷

This speaks for itself, and is an illustration of the doctrine given above. John is but a faithful and consistent evolution of the thought of Christ as found in the synoptists.

Since the establishment of the Biblical Commission, there has been great activity in *Scripture work* among Catholics. In all the leading reviews, in books, in pamphlets, all sorts and kinds of questions are being mooted, and none more than the question of the nature of inspiration and its effects. The wisest think the time not ripe for definite decision, but all recognize that the question of inspiration is the burning question of the hour. The Jesuit Hummelauer has given us a very notable contribution on the subject;⁸ and Father LaGrange, in his *Méthode historique*,⁹ treats the subject with the learning of a critic, and the acumen of a scholar trained in the order that gave to the church Thomas Aquinas. The formula, "God is the author of Scripture," comes to the church from the earliest ages, and is consecrated by the Councils of Florence and Trent. But because many are the ways of conceiving divine authorship, this decision leaves much to be inferred, much to be determined by direct observation. Father LaGrange is anxious to point out that the *a priori* method of inference must have its place; but the application of the *a priori* principle must ever be modified by direct observation of facts of the

⁶ See, as an example of the affirmative answer: J. Bovon, *Théologie du Nouveau Testament*, I, 2d ed., pp. 162 ff.; F. Godet, *Commentaire sur l'évangile de saint Jean*, I, 4th ed. (Neuchâtel, 1902), pp. 138 ff.; Batiffol, *Six leçons sur les évangiles* (Paris, 1897), pp. 125 ff. Stevens, *The Theology of the New Testament*, p. 176.

⁷ See B. Weiss, *Lehrbuch der biblischen Theologie*, §§ 10, 11; Lagrange, *Revue biblique*, 1903, pp. 299, 300; Rose, *Études sur les évangiles*, 2d ed. (Paris, 1902), p. 63, n. 1.

⁸ *Exegetisches zur Inspirationsfrage, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf das Alte Testament*. Von Franz von Hummelauer. St. Louis, Mo.: Herder, 1904.

⁹ *La méthode historique*. Par Marie-Joseph LaGrange. Paris: Lecoffre, 1904.

Sacred Writings, and these facts are so many that within the past few years the whole question may be said to have entered upon an entirely new phase, and in the new phase scientific investigation holds a much larger place than it did in the elder day when the *a priori* method dominated the situation. Thus, while Father LaGrange, in describing the nature and influence of inspiration would proceed chiefly by way of logical inference from the data of revelation and the principles of psychology, still he adds: "It is proper that greater reserve be maintained in applying this mental process to the divine historical fact itself." We know so little of God's ways that

when it is a question of affirming what may or may not be the object of divine inspiration, or to whom it was proper that the gift should be imparted (though we may not lose sight of the exigencies of reason), we should be cautious in concluding by way of inference as to what is or is not fitting.

Facts must outweigh our preconceived ideas concerning the fitness of things, and, in working out these principles, he insists that an inspired book may be anonymous, nay pseudonymous, and it may be the work of several authors. The more delicate subject of biblical inerrancy is also touched upon. He speaks thus of the purpose of inspiration:

The purpose of inspiration is not essentially to give immediate information, but to preserve with a divine authority what we ought to know, to show clearly that the teaching contained in the Bible, although sometimes given directly and clearly, is often also a resultant which is exceedingly difficult to understand correctly; and it is for this reason that the interpretation of the Bible has been intrusted to the church alone (p. 92).

With this principal clearly stated he asks the question:

Was all the history that God willed to preserve, then, free from imperfections in respect to religious truth? Even if the principles are established, the application of them is a very delicate matter. Whatever the sacred writers teach, God teaches, and consequently it is true. But what is it that the sacred writers teach? What do they categorically affirm? But it has long been admitted that the Bible is not a collection of theses or categorical affirmations. It belongs to that type of literature in which nothing is absolutely affirmed as to the reality of the facts. These facts serve solely as a basis for a moral lesson, as in the case of a parable. Now, inspiration does not change the characteristics of literary types. Each one must be interpreted according to its peculiar rules. It is evident that in the Bible this teaching is not in the form of revealed propositions entirely complete and isolated in their splendor. It is a mixture of narratives, discussions, poetic effusions, anecdotes, prayers, and metaphors (p. 93).

Also in the *Revue biblique* for April he touches another phase of the subject when he says that there are many things in the Bible which are

related, without being affirmed as articles of belief, and he alludes to what he terms "profane things." These he is perfectly ready to accept, if there are reasons for such acceptance; but no one can compel acceptance of truths of the profane order, because there is nothing to prove that such things are imposed upon us as articles of belief, for the simple reason that, being of the profane order, they cannot of themselves be objects of faith.

These few extracts, culled here and there from works that are current in Roman Catholic circles, will perhaps be indicative of the trend of the new apologetic. The novelty does not seem to frighten the intelligent among Catholics. They seemingly desire to embrace the truth, in whatever form it comes, mindful ever that truth is one, and that erroneous positions must soon be detected; mindful, too, that, while it is human to err, there is in the church an abiding spirit of truth which is ever leading men into the fuller light, even though the modes of thought determining men's convictions are different today from what they have been in ages that are gone.

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In this treatise¹⁰ on the eucharist we are moving in the atmosphere of the ancient Catholic church, as it adapted Christian teaching to the ways of thought and expression in the Græco-Roman world. No effort is made to interpret or to readjust the eucharistic language to modern conditions, no effort to explain what is assumed to be an ineffable mystery. The author travels over the whole field of discussion from Paul down to the moment in the Latin church, when, in the ninth century, strict "realism" first asserted without qualification that the bread of the eucharist was changed by a miracle into that body of Christ which was born of Mary. This becomes the standard by which M. Batiffol passes judgment on every antecedent utterance and finds that all alike, though in different degrees and with varying approximations, fall short of the highest truth.

But M. Batiffol does not fail to notice modern speculation. In his chapter entitled "Critique de théories récentes" he gives the theories of Hoffmann, Spitta, Weizsäcker, Jülicher, and Holtzmann; but he states them for the purpose of refutation only. He discerns in the view of Weizsäcker, which has been more fully developed by Jülicher, "une interprétation subtile et séduisante," but he does justice to it in his statement:

¹⁰ *Études d'histoire et de théologie positive*. Deuxième série: L'eucharistie, la présence réelle, et la transsubstantiation. Par Pierre Batiffol. Paris: Lecoffre, 1905. 388 pages. Fr. 3.50.

Weizsäcker first suggested the word "parable," and characterized the words spoken over the bread and the wine as a parable to which Christ has not given the key. Jülicher admits that this parable was by no means an enigma to the disciples. There was no deep and premeditated design in the words of Christ. A simple association of ideas led him to compare the bread to his body, and the wine to his blood. There is no more significance in this simile than in the case where Christ (John 15:1 f.) calls himself the vine and his Father the husbandman. But here it has a more pathetic meaning. In the hour when everything points to his approaching death, and when Christ's spirit is itself sad even to death, Christ takes occasion, in breaking the bread and blessing the wine, to teach his disciples that his death is to be for them a source of blessing. Christ solaces his own heart; and not for his disciples only, but for himself, he finds a word to indicate how a man can meet the ruin of all his plans and of all his hopes.

Upon this statement M. Batiffol comments: "This is a beautiful conception, but it is the creation of Jülicher."

But within his chosen field of inquiry, with its inevitable limitations, M. Batiffol moves with the air of supreme mastery of the situation. His discussion is learned and scholarly, omitting no utterance of any importance, and above all absolutely fair and impartial. His work, therefore, has great value in the department of doctrine-history. The passages about which Roman Catholics and Protestants have disputed since the Reformation come up for a rehearing by a judge who has honesty of purpose, as well as abundant knowledge and clear insight. Everywhere he shows downright unwillingness to twist language or distort expression in the interest of some prejudged conclusion. He admits that Cyril of Jerusalem comes near to the true doctrine of "conversion of substance," but he refuses his assent to Loofs's opinion that Cyril practically asserted transubstantiation in the comparison of the water changed to wine. Cyril, the patriarch of Alexandria, approximated the true view, but he was under the influence of the controversy about the "two natures" and saw only the fusion of the bread with the body of Christ. On the other hand, Pope Gelasius fell short of the full truth, misled by the monophysite controversy into adopting a false analogy, when he interpreted the eucharist in harmony with the Chalcedonian formula. The early Alexandrian writers, Clement and Origen, failed because they sought allegorical interpretation of the mystery. In treating the African writers, he remarks of Tertullian: "Aucune subtilité d'exégèse ne permettra de dire que Tertullien a reconnu dans l'eucharistie la vérité du corps du Christ." Among Latin writers, Ambrose alone came so near the truth that he may be said to have contributed the direct line of thought which the doctrine of transubstantiation followed. Augustine was a symbolist, maintaining the *praesentia spiri-*

tualis, and by his great influence in the West retarding the progress toward the truth. Ratramnus did little more than reaffirm the teaching of Augustine, and the same is true of Berengar at a later time.

Out of all the writers of the first eight centuries, M. Batiffol approves only two, as leading in the right direction—Gregory of Nyssa and Ambrose. "Among the Romans the authority of Augustine until the ninth century sanctioned a language which made an abstraction of the subject, allowed long periods of uncertainty, and gave rise to bitter controversies, which, even outside Catholicism, still exist."

It might almost seem as if M. Batiffol admitted that in the long controversy Protestant scholars who have affirmed that the doctrine of "conversion of substance" was not taught in the ancient Catholic church have been nearer the truth than Roman Catholic scholars who have found transubstantiation in the language of Justin, of Irenæus, and most of the writers who followed them, even yielding with difficulty the allegorical Alexandrians. But, on the other hand, M. Batiffol finds what he calls "realism" in every church father of any prominence; or, in other words, that even if they take the symbolical or figurative view of the sacrament, yet they all agree that some objective gift is imparted, which is tied to the bread and the wine, as by some organic law. Here M. Batiffol falls back upon the theory of Dr. Harnack, and applies it vigorously, that the ancient writers did not use the word "symbol" in the modern sense, distinguishing between the symbol and that which it signified; but the symbol was in some manner that which it symbolized. Hence M. Batiffol applies the term "realistic" to the earlier teaching about the eucharist, as opposed to "spiritual," which is subjective and unreal. Realism becomes the first stage in the development of transubstantiation.

It is at this point that the issue must be taken. M. Batiffol discredits the erudition of Luther, who had maintained that transubstantiation was based on the false philosophy of Aristotle. Luther, it is true, was mistaken in affirming that the Latin doctrine was first taught by Aquinas. But that it is based upon Aristotelian premises may yet be true. According to the Platonic teaching—and under its influence were nearly all the writers of the ancient church—that which is spiritual is most real. "Realism," as the word is used by M. Batiffol, is a misnomer, part of our Aristotelian heritage of the Middle Ages, which makes the spiritual to be unreal, and that which is physical or quasi-corporal to be alone the real. The spiritual presence of Christ is the most real presence.

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